Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Let me just, in the chairman’s absence, thank him for these hearings.

I was not able to be here this morning, but I do think that

these are obviously very important hearings, and I think this is

what this committee is supposed to do, and it is good, as a member

of this committee for 18 years now, to see it in advance of decisions

doing its work this way, and I think probably every committee

member probably feels affirmative about that.

I think the way the chairman has constructed it is good. I think

it is right not to have the administration here at this point, and

that we sort of lay some groundwork here.

I was in the region earlier in the year and met at some length

with Saudis, with the Crown Prince Abdullah, the Foreign Minister

and others, with King Abdullah, with their intelligence agencies,

President Mubarak, his intelligence people, and came away with a

sense that most of them believe—at least they express this—that

we are sort of overexaggerating and overly worried about some aspects

of Saddam Hussein, though they do not like him. They acknowledge

that, but they certainly interpret some of the threat differently,

President Mubarak, I might add, quite dismissively believing

that we sort of build him up in some ways.

I am not sure I agree with them. I mean, they live there, but if

you assess what we believe he may or may not have, I do not think

anybody believes he has a nuclear program today that I have heard

with any great conviction. We know he had about 7,000 people that

were working on the program once upon a time, but our estimates

are today that he may have at least a couple of dozen top-flight nuclear

scientists and engineers, but there is probably no doubt he is

working on it, and I think most of us have to make the assumption that he is.

Second, he has got some continued shorter range missile development

that he has been doing. That could help with a longer range

missile, but it is not a direct, longer range missile program, and we

estimate that he has somewhere up to two dozen Scuds or so, and

obviously that has some potential for menace with respect to Israel,

particularly if we were starting to engage in some way, but I understand

from Israeli authorities not so much that they do not believe

the overall value of changing the equation in the region is not worthwhile.

So there is a lot to sort of balance here. I am of the opinion that,

under the right circumstances, it is not that difficult. I think I tend

to agree with General McInerney, I think there are, according to

the intelligence sources that I have listened to, without revealing

any of it, capacities for significantly more internal activity than

maybe some people anticipate, so I think it is achievable.

I think the question that we need to think about is sort of when

and how, what is the process, what brings you to the point of pulling

the trigger, what sort of makes you reach that point where you

have made the decision that you have exhausted the doctrine of

remedies, if you will, in the context of international law and of going to war?

Certainly one of the lessons of prior conflicts is that it helps to

have the American people fully supportive, fully educated, fully involved,

and clear about the objectives, and prepared to stay the

course. There is nothing in what we have done to date that prepares

the American people for that, or that even lays out on the

international stage a sufficient level of rationale, evidence, public

diplomacy that might bring you, I think to that legitimate trigger pulling stage.

It seems to me that we are sitting—and I want to ask you particularly,

dean, about this, but I would like others to comment

about it. I mean, there is a process here that it seems to me has

been avoided to date. The rhetoric seems to be far ahead of our capacity,

and we seem to be ignoring and dismissive of the need for

friends and allies and understanding on a global basis of why we

might ultimately choose to do this.

Now, there is in place a very forceful cease-fire agreement which

Saddam Hussein signed and agreed to, and it includes the full destruction

of these weapons and the full inspection. Does it not

make more sense, in terms of all of these sensitivities that I have

jut laid out, gentlemen, in terms of gaining the legitimacy of the

American people, the assent, the consent of the American people

and the assent, gaining the support and understanding of the

world as to why we would be doing this, to go back to that process,

even though we know he will refuse to live up to it?

Certainly, if he has the things that he does not want us to find,

he will not live up to it, so those who want the justification to go

in will get the justification, but in the absence of that, we do not

have a chance of having exhausted that doctrine of remedies in a

way that I think answers the question to mom and pop in America

as to why their young child may come home in a body bag.

Now, is there a process here that has been avoided, dean, beginning

with you, that we should go through that would better position

us with respect to the potentials of this, and the opposite side

of that question is, we lived with Russia for almost 50 years with

the capacity to destroy us many times over, and a policy of containment

worked there. Why could not a policy of containment also

work here, at least while you buildup to that point of legitimacy?

But there is a certain visible logistical period of

time under any circumstances here, during which time you could

certainly provide a sufficiently more powerful ultimatum than existed

previously with respect to inspections.